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INTRODUCTION 
 
In June 2009, less than a month after the Supreme Court decided 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,1 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg told her audience at 
the Second Circuit Judicial Conference that, in her opinion, “the 
Court’s majority messed up the Federal Rules.”2 Justice Ginsburg’s 
comment was a sign of the federal courts’ growing struggle with Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly3 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, two cases that 
transformed the requirements for pleadings in all civil cases under the 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2011, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. 
1 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
2 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, 
Remarks for Second Circuit Judicial Conference (June 12, 2009), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp
_ 06-12-09.html. 
3 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4 In Twombly, a complex anti-trust 
case, the Supreme Court introduced plausibility as a new requirement 
for pleadings.5 The Court in Twombly held that a complaint must state 
“a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” to meet the requirements 
of Rule 8(a)(2)6 and to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)7 motion to dismiss.8 
Two years later in Iqbal, a less complex discrimination case, the Court 
confirmed that the new plausibility requirement applies to “all civil 
actions.”9 
Swanson v. Citibank,10 a case that the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit decided on July 30, 2010, reveals just how “messed 
up” things have become. In Swanson, a pro se plaintiff sued Citibank, 
a real estate appraisal company, and the appraisal company’s 
employee for racial discrimination in connection with Citibank’s 
denial of her application for a home equity loan.11 The district court 
dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 
plausible claim,12 but the court of appeals reversed.13 Writing for the 
majority, Judge Diane Wood interpreted Twombly and Iqbal to mean 
that a complaint must include sufficient factual detail to “present a 
story that holds together.”14 In dissent, Judge Posner strongly 
criticized the majority’s liberal reading of Twombly and Iqbal and 
                                                 
4 The Supreme Court in Iqbal transformed the pleading requirements by 
confirming that the “plausibility” requirement from Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 
applied to “all civil actions.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953. 
5 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548. 
6 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (“[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must 
contain: . . . (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief”). 
7 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (“a party may assert the following defenses by 
motion: . . . (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”). 
8 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
9 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953. 
10 614 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2010). 
11 Id. at 402. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 407. 
14 Id. at 404. 
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interpreted the two cases to mean that a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual allegations to override any “obvious alternative 
explanation” for the plaintiff’s injury.15 While the majority held that 
the plaintiff’s relatively minimalist complaint was sufficient to state a 
plausible claim,16 Judge Poser thought that “error” was the more 
obvious and natural explanation for the defendants’ denial of the 
plaintiff’s home equity loan application.17 Judge Posner argued that 
the court should have relied on its “judicial experience and common 
sense” to reach this conclusion, and that the district court’s dismissal 
should have been affirmed.18 
The majority and dissenting opinions in Swanson reveal the strong 
disagreement in the Seventh Circuit over how courts should interpret 
and apply Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility requirement. This Note 
will examine this disagreement and will ultimately argue that Judge 
Diane Wood’s majority opinion provides the correct approach. After 
providing a history of pleading in general and of pleading in the 
Seventh Circuit in particular, this Note will argue that, in deciding 
Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, judges must be careful to not overly 
rely on their “judicial experience and common sense” such that they 
effectively turn a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary 
judgment.19 Instead, as the court held in Swanson, the question judges 
must ask themselves when deciding whether a complaint presents a 
claim that is “plausible on its face” is whether the factual allegations, 
taken as true, “present a story that holds together” and upon which the 
plaintiff could recover.20 In assessing this, a judge should look to his 
                                                 
15 Id. at 407–08 (Posner, J., dissenting) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 
1937, 1951–52 (2010)). 
16 Id. at 405. 
17 Id. at 408. 
18 Id. at 407–09. 
19 See Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to 
Dismiss Under Twombly and Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 17 (2010). This 
Note will heavily rely on the arguments of Professor Suja A. Thomas, who has 
argued that Twombly and Iqbal have effectively turned the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss into the “new summary judgment motion.” Id. 
20 Swanson, 614 F.3d at 404. 
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or her “judicial experience and common sense” only for an objective 
standard, not as a source for facts or considerations beyond the 
allegations of the complaint upon which to base inferences that favor 
the party moving for dismissal.21 In the end, this Note argues that the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached the correct result in 
Swanson. 
 
I. HISTORY OF PLEADING RULES 
 
Professors Kevin M. Clermont and Stephen C. Yeazell have 
called pleading “the gatekeeper for civil litigation.”22 If pleading is the 
gatekeeper, then prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in 1938, judges were quick to close the gates on plaintiffs’ 
claims because they followed technical pleading rules.23 For the 
second half of the twentieth century, on the other hand, federal judges 
held the gates open because they followed the liberal notice pleading 
standard that the Supreme Court introduced in Conley v. Gibson.24 
                                                 
21 See infra Part IV. 
22 Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing 
Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 824 (2010) (“Pleading serves as the gatekeeper for 
civil litigation.”); see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1202 (2004 ed. & 2009 supp.) (describing the four 
functions traditionally served by pleadings, one of which was to provide “a means 
for speedy disposition of sham claims and insubstantial defenses”). 
23 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22 (“At common law there was a 
generally held belief in the efficacy of pleadings. The whole grand scheme was 
premised on the assumption that by proceeding through a maze of rigid, and often 
numerous, stages of denial, avoidance, or demurrer, eventually the dispute would be 
reduced to a single issue of law or fact that would dispose of the case.”); see also 
David M. Roberts, Fact Pleading, Notice Pleading, and Standing, 65 CORNELL L. 
REV. 390, 395 (1980) (describing the Field Code as a “scheme [that] placed 
considerable emphasis on hypertechnical artifices of pleading . . . [under which] any 
gains in precise issue-identification came at the expense of many otherwise valid 
claims that were dismissed for inadequate pleadings”). 
24 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (holding that a complaint need only contain “‘a 
short and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of 
what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests”) (quoting FED. R. 
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Very recently, the gatekeeper has become selective again. According 
to Clermont and Yeazell, the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal 
developed “a robust gatekeeping regime” to replace liberal notice 
pleading.25 To understand how pleading rules have evolved in this 
manner, it is necessary to give a brief overview of the history of 
pleading rules. 
 
A. 1848 to 1938: The Field Code26 
 
The Field Code was the first major departure from common law 
pleading in the United States.27 David Dudley Field developed the 
Field Code during the mid-nineteenth century to reform the New York 
courts’ approach to pleading.28 The Field Code provided that a 
complaint should contain “[a] statement of the facts constituting the 
cause of action, in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, 
and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding 
to know what is intended.”29 Plaintiffs were required to plead the “dry, 
naked, actual facts” giving rise to a cause of action.30 During its time, 
                                                                                                                   
CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 22, at 825 (“Under the 
[Federal] Rules [of Civil Procedure] . . . pleading was a pervious gate.”). 
25 Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 22, at 823 (describing the Court’s decisions 
in Twombly and Iqbal as a “choice to replace minimal notice pleading with a robust 
gatekeeping regime”). 
26 The Field Code was adopted in New York in 1848. Richard L. Marcus, The 
Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. 
REV. 433, 438 (1986). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938. 
Id. at 433. 
27 Id. at 438. 
28 Id. at 438–39. 
29 Id. (quoting An Act to simplify and abridge the Practice, Pleadings and 
Proceedings of the Courts of this State, ch. 379, § 120(2), 1848 N.Y. Laws 521). 
30 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22 (quoting POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES 
§ 423 at 640 (5th ed. 1929)). Prior to the Field Code, plaintiffs were required under 
the common law to plead technical causes of action. Hon. Charles E. Clark, 
Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 459 (1943) (“With the development of code 
pleading . . . the emphasis was shifted from the detailed issue-pleading of the 
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the Field Code was the rule of procedure in effect in many federal 
courts because, from 1872 to 1938, the Conformity Act provided that 
each federal court was to employ the pleading rules of the state in 
which it was located.31 
Although the Field Code aimed for simplicity, states that adopted 
it ultimately developed a complicated system that distinguished 
between “legal conclusions,” “ultimate facts,” and “evidentiary 
facts.”32 Pleading of legal conclusions and evidentiary facts was 
impermissible, while pleading of ultimate facts was desired.33 Cases 
were often dismissed based upon technical distinctions between legal 
conclusions and ultimate facts, rather than on the merits.34 A 
widespread criticism of the Field Code’s distinction between legal 
conclusions and ultimate facts was that there was no logical distinction 
to be made; because the difference was one of degree only, rather than 
of kind, the distinction was arbitrary.35 
 
B. 1938 to 2007: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 
Liberal Notice Pleading 
 
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sought to 
avoid the confusing distinction between “legal conclusions,” “ultimate 
facts,” and “evidentiary facts” that had mired pleadings under the 
Field Code.36 Charles E. Clark and the drafters of the Federal Rules 
advocated a liberal approach to pleading.37 Accordingly, the Federal 
                                                                                                                   
common law to a statement of facts, so simple, it was said at the time, that even a 
child could write a letter to the court telling of its case.”). 
31 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22, at n.4. 
32 Roberts, supra note 23, at 395; see also Marcus, supra note 26, at 438. 
33 Roberts, supra note 23, at 395. 
34 Id. at 395–96. 
35 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22; see also CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK 
OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 38 at 301 (2d ed. 1947) (“[T]he attempted 
distinction between facts, law, and evidence, viewed as anything other than a 
convenient distinction of degree, seems philosophically and logically unsound.”). 
36 Marcus, supra note 26, at 438–39. 
37 Id. at 439. 
 6
6
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 2
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol6/iss1/2
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 6, Issue 1                            Fall 2010 
 
Rules, adopted in 1938, substantially narrowed the function served by 
pleadings.38 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a 
complaint need only provide “a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”39 The other functions 
that pleadings historically served—stating the facts, narrowing the 
issues, and “providing a means for speedy disposition of sham claims 
and insubstantial defenses”—were left to devices other than pleadings, 
including discovery, pretrial conferences, and summary judgment.40 
The Federal Rules’ liberal approach to pleading became known as 
“notice pleading” following the Supreme Court’s 1957 decision in 
Conley v. Gibson.41 In Conley, several African-American union 
members brought an action for declaratory judgment and injunction 
against their union representative.42 The plaintiffs alleged that the 
representative, as their collective bargaining agent, had failed to 
protect the African-American union members from discriminatory 
discharge in favor of white employees, in violation of the Railway 
Labor Act.43 The district court dismissed the complaint, and the court 
of appeals affirmed.44  
The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the 
plaintiffs’ complaint.45 The Supreme Court famously held that a 
                                                 
38 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22 (“Because the only function left 
exclusively to the pleadings by the federal rules is that of giving notice, federal 
courts have frequently said that the rules have adopted a system of ‘notice 
pleading.’”). 
39 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
40 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22. 
41 355 U.S. 41 (1957). A similarly high water mark came in Dioguardi v. 
Durning, where Justice Charles E. Clark, former head of the drafting committee of 
the Federal Rules, reversed the dismissal of a pro se complaint because, although 
“obviously home drawn” and “however inarticulately they may be stated, the 
plaintiff has disclosed his claims . . . [and the court does] not see how the plaintiff 
may properly be deprived of his day in court to show what he obviously so firmly 
believes.” 139 F.2d 774, 774–75 (2d Cir. 1944). 
42 Conley, 355 U.S. at 42–43. 
43 Id. at 43. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 44. 
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complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 8(a)(2) “unless it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.”46 This sentence 
has become known as Conley’s “no set of facts” language.47 The 
Conley Court went on to hold that the Federal Rules do not require 
plaintiffs to fill their complaints will detailed factual allegations, but 
instead require only “a short and plain statement of the claim” that is 
sufficient to give the opposing party “fair notice” of the claim and “the 
grounds upon which it rests.”48 The Court’s holding in Conley became 
the precedent for a half-century of liberal notice pleading in federal 
courts.49 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Conley’s liberal notice pleading 
standard as recently as 2002.50 In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, the plaintiff 
alleged that his employer had demoted and fired him based on his 
national origin and age.51 The district court dismissed the complaint 
on grounds that the plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts to 
establish a discrimination claim.52 The court of appeals affirmed, 
reasoning that a discrimination claim in the Second Circuit must 
contain more than mere “naked assertions” to state a claim upon w
relief can be granted.
hich 
 the 
ugh 
 as 
                                                
53 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
Second Circuit’s heightened pleading requirement did not comport 
with the liberal notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2).54 Altho
the Supreme Court reaffirmed liberal notice pleading as recently
Swierkiewicz, the Court has since changed course. 
 
46 Id. at 45–46. 
47 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561 (2007). 
48 Conley, 355 U.S. at 47 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). 
49 Conley’s liberal notice pleading standard remained in full force until the 
Supreme Court retired Conley’s  “no set of facts” language in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561. 
50 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
51 Id. at 508–09. 
52 Id. at 509. 
53 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, No. 00-9010, 2001 WL 245077, at *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 
12, 2001) (unpublished). 
54 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. 
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C. 2007 to the Present: A Trio of Cases that Transformed Pleading 
(or that “Messed up the Federal Rules”) 
 
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the 
Supreme Court fundamentally altered its interpretation of what Rule 
8(a)(2) requires of pleadings. In Twombly, the Court retired Conley’s 
“no set of facts” language and held that Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a 
complaint contain sufficient factual allegations to state “a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.”55 In Iqbal, the Court held that this 
new plausibility requirement applies to “all civil actions.”56 Yet, 
between its decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, the Court issued a per 
curiam opinion in Erickson v. Pardus,57 in which it held that Conley’s 
“notice pleading” language was still good law following Twombly.58 
 
1. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 
 
The Court first introduced plausibility as a new requirement for 
pleadings in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.59 The plaintiffs in 
Twombly were the class of all individuals who had subscribed to 
telephone service since 1996 from the Baby Bells, which were the 
local telephone service providers that survived after the break-up of 
AT&T in 1984.60 The plaintiffs alleged that several of the Baby Bells 
had engaged in parallel conduct in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 
which proscribes any “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce.”61 The district court dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ complaint, holding that it alleged parallel conduct but did 
not allege the existence of a contract, combination, or conspiracy in 
                                                 
55 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
56 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009). 
57 551 U.S. 89 (2007). 
58 Id. at 93. 
59 550 U.S. at 570. 
60 Id. at 550. 
61 Id. at 548 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1). 
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restraint of trade.62 The Second Circuit reversed, relying on Conley to 
hold that dismissal was improper because the defendants had not 
proven that there was “no set of facts” that could entitle the plaintiffs 
to relief.63 
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, holding that the 
plaintiffs’ complaint did not state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.64 In so doing, the Court departed from a half-century of 
permitting lower courts to apply a “focused and literal reading” of 
Conley’s “no set of facts” language.65 The Court stated that it no 
longer sufficed for a complaint to merely reveal “the theory of the 
claim.”66 Instead, the Court interpreted Rule 8(a)(2) to require that a 
complaint contain sufficient allegations “to state a claim to relief that 
is plausible on its face.”67 Although the Court noted that a complaint 
still need not contain specific facts beyond those necessary to state a 
claim and give fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it 
rests,68 the Court held that a complaint must contain sufficient facts to 
move the claim “across the line from conceivable to plausible.”69 
Filling a complaint with “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not get the claim 
over the line.70 
The Supreme Court went on to hold that Conley’s “no set of 
facts” language had earned its retirement.71 The Court criticized the 
“focused and literal reading” of Conley that permitted conclusory 
                                                 
62 Id. at 552. 
63 Id. at 553. 
64 Id. at 570. 
65 Cf. id. at 561–63. The Court in Twombly discussed and criticized the Court 
of Appeals’ “focused and literal reading of Conley’s ‘no set of facts’” language, id. 
at 561–62, but recognized that “we have not previously explained the circumstances 
and rejected the literal interpretation of the [‘no set of facts’] passage,” id. at 563 n.8. 
66 Id. at 561. 
67 Id. at 570. 
68 Id. at 555. 
69 Id. at 570. 
70 Id. at 555. 
71 Id. at 563. 
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claims to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.72 Under that 
reading, a complaint would survive as long as there was some chance 
that the plaintiff could later prove some previously undisclosed facts to 
support his or her claim.73 The Court said that courts taking this 
approach had misinterpreted the long-accepted rule that “once a claim 
has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of 
facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”74 This long-
held rule was meant to describe “the breadth of opportunity to prove 
what an adequate complaint claims, not the minimum standard of 
adequate pleading to govern a comp 75laint.”  
                                                
The Court in Twombly held that the plaintiffs’ complaint did not 
state a plausible claim.76 The Court reasoned that the “natural 
explanation” for the defendants’ alleged parallel conduct was not that 
the defendants had entered into an illegal anti-competitive 
agreement.77 Rather, the Court reasoned that the more natural 
explanation was that the local telephone service providers had merely 
continued their monopolistic behavior in their respective markets after 
the government had ordered the AT&T Company broken up in 1984.78 
Because the allegations did nothing to override this more natural 
explanation, the Court held that the complaint did not “state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face” and should have been dismissed.79 
 
2. Erickson v. Pardus 
 
Two weeks after the Supreme Court retired Conley’s “no set of 
facts” language and ushered in plausibility as a new requirement for 
pleadings, the Court issued a per curiam opinion that cast significant 
 
72 Id. at 561. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 563. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 570. 
77 Id. at 564. 
78 Id. at 568. 
79 Id. at 570. 
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doubt on the transformative nature of Twombly.80 In Erickson v. 
Pardus, a prisoner filed a pro se suit against several prison officials for 
terminating his treatment program for hepatitis C in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.81 The district court dismissed his complaint, holding that 
it contained only conclusory allegations that the plaintiff had suffered 
an “independent cognizable harm” as a result of the defendants’ 
termination of his treatment.82 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit affirmed.83  
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals 
erred when it held that the plaintiff’s allegations “were too 
conclusory” to state a claim to relief.84 In reaching its holding, the 
Court made no mention of Twombly’s plausibility requirement.85 
Rather, the Court reiterated that Rule 8(a)(2) imposes a “liberal 
pleading standard.”86 The Court cited Twombly (which was citing 
Conley) for the rule that, under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint need only 
give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which 
it rests.87 Thus, despite overruling Conley’s “no set of facts” language 
two weeks earlier,88 the Court held that Conley’s “notice pleading” 
language was still good law.89 Following the Court’s decision in 
Erickson, many courts interpreted it to mean that Twombly’s 
plausibility requirement was limited to complex anti-trust cases.90 
                                                 
80 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007). 
81 Id. at 89–90. 
82 Id. at 92–93. 
83 Id. at 92–93. 
84 Id. at 93. 
85 See id. at 89–95. 
86 Id. at 94. 
87 Id. at 93 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) 
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957))). 
88 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563. 
89 Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93. 
90 See, e.g., Doss v. Clearwater Title Co., 551 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(“The Supreme Court’s decision in Erickson v. Pardus . . . put to rest any concern 
that Twombly signaled an end to notice pleading in the federal courts.”). 
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3. Ashcroft v. Iqbal 
 
The next development came in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, in which the 
Supreme Court dispelled everyone’s doubts concerning the scope of 
Twombly’s holding and held that the plausibility requirement applies 
to “all civil actions.”91 In Iqbal, the plaintiff, who was a Pakistani and 
a Muslim, sued former U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI 
Director Robert Mueller for adopting a discriminatory policy of 
detaining Arab Muslim men in the aftermath of the September 11 
attacks.92 Following the September 11 attacks, Iqbal had been detained 
on charges of identification fraud and conspiracy to defraud the United 
States.93 He had been deemed to be “of high interest” to the 
investigation into the attacks and had been held in a maximum-
security prison.94 The plaintiff alleged that Ashcroft’s and Mueller’s 
policies led to him being confined on account of his race, religion, or 
national origin.95 
The defendants in Iqbal filed their Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss before the Supreme Court decided Twombly.96 As a result, the 
district court denied the defendant’s motion, relying on Conley’s “no 
set of facts” language.97 The defendants appealed, and the Supreme 
Court decided Twombly while the appeal was pending.98 The Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed Twombly but held that its 
plausibility requirement applied only to complex cases in which 
additional detail would prove helpful.99 The court of appeals did not 
                                                 
91 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009). 
92 Id. at 1942. 
93 Id. at 1943. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 1944. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
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consider Iqbal to be such a case, so it affirmed the district court’s 
ruling.100 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.101 First, the 
Court held that the plausibility requirement from Twombly applies to 
“all civil actions.”102 Next, the Court described the plausibility 
requirement as a two-pronged test for deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
to dismiss.103 The first prong is to disregard legal conclusions, or 
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.”104 The 
Court explained that, although Rule 8(a)(2) was a major departure 
from the technical requirements of the code-pleading era, “it does not 
unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more 
than conclusions.”105 The second prong is to presume all remaining 
well-pleaded facts to be true and to dismiss any complaint that does 
not “state a plausible claim for relief.”106 The Court said that the task 
of determining whether a claim is plausible requires the court “to draw 
on its judicial experience and common sense.”107 
Applying the first prong to the complaint in Iqbal, the Court 
disregarded two allegations because they were legal conclusions. First, 
the Court disregarded the allegation that Attorney General John 
Ashcroft and FBI Director Dan Mueller knowingly, willfully, and 
maliciously agreed to detain Iqbal on account of his religion, race, or 
national origin “as a matter of policy . . . and for no legitimate 
penological interest.”108 Second, the Court disregarded the allegation 
that Attorney General Ashcroft was the “principal architect” of the 
policy and that FBI Director Mueller was “instrumental” in adopting 
                                                 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 1945. 
102 Id. at 1953 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1) (stating that Rule 8 “governs the 
pleading standard ‘in all civil actions in the United States district courts’”). 
103 Id. at 1949–50. 
104 Id. at 1949. 
105 Id. at 1950. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 1951. 
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and executing it.109 The Court considered these allegations to be 
“formulaic recitation[s] of the elements” of a constitutional 
discrimination claim.110 
Applying the second prong of its test to Iqbal’s complaint, the 
Court assumed to be true the plaintiff’s factual allegations that FBI 
Director Mueller directed the FBI to arrest and detain “thousands of 
Arab Muslim men” during its investigation into the September 11 
attacks and that the policy of detaining these men “in highly restrictive 
conditions” was approved by Attorney General Ashcroft and FBI 
director Mueller.111 The Court held that, even taking these allegations 
to be true, the plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim for relief.112 
The Court reasoned that the allegations had an “obvious alternative 
explanation,” namely, that the arrests were lawful and were motivated 
by a “nondiscriminatory intent” to hold in custody persons who may 
have had connections to the Al Qaeda members who committed the 
Septermber 11 attacks.113 Just as it had in Twombly, the Court 
considered the plaintiff’s claim to be implausible in light of this more 
obvious explanation.114 
 
II. SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS BEFORE AND AFTER TWOMBLY AND 
IQBAL 
 
A. Seventh Circuit Cases Prior to Twombly 
 
Prior to Twombly, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
was a strict devotee of Conley’s liberal notice pleading standard.115 
                                                 
109 Id. 
110 Id. (citations omitted). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567 (2007)).  
114 Id. 
115 See, e.g., Riley v. Vilsack, 665 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1000–01 (W.D. Wis. 2009) 
(noting that, prior to Twombly, “the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
interpreted Rule 8 to require plaintiffs to do no more than provide enough notice to 
allow the defendant to file an answer. . . . Plaintiffs did not need to plead facts for 
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The case of Vincent v. City Colleges of Chicago exemplifies the 
Seventh Circuit’s pre-Twombly approach.116 In Vincent, the author of a 
book on buying foreclosures sued the City Colleges of Chicago and 
the publisher of the book for alleged violations of the federal copyright 
and trademark laws.117 The City Colleges of Chicago had offered a 
course under the same name as the book’s title, and the publisher had 
continued publishing the book without the author’s permission and 
without paying her royalties.118 The district court dismissed most of 
the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), finding defective, among other 
things, the complaint’s failure to include the plaintiff’s registered U.S. 
Patent and Trademark numbers.119 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.120 Writing 
for the court, Judge Easterbrook provided a terse and strongly worded 
summary of the Seventh Circuit’s approach to notice pleading under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): 
 
[A] judicial order dismissing a complaint because the plaintiff 
did not plead facts has a short half-life. “Any decision 
declaring ‘this complaint is deficient because it does not 
allege X’ is a candidate for summary reversal . . . . Civil Rule 
8 calls for a short and plain statement; the plaintiff pleads 
claims, not facts or legal theories. . . . Factual detail comes 
later—perhaps in a motion for a more definite statement, . . . 
perhaps in response to a motion for summary judgment. Until 
then, the possibility that facts to be adduced later, and 
consistent with the complaint, could prove the claim, is 
enough for the litigation to move forward.121 
                                                                                                                   
each element of a claim. . . . A complaint could ‘not be dismissed on the ground that 
it is conclusory or fails to allege facts.’”) (citations omitted). 
116 485 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2007). 
117 Id. at 921. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 922–24. 
120 Id. at 926. 
121 Id. at 923 (citations omitted). 
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Judge Easterbrook went on to reason that, although a plaintiff must 
ultimately prove some fact at trial, the plaintiff does not have to allege 
that fact in his or her complaint.122 After noting that Rule 8(a)(2) was 
adopted in 1938 and that Conley v. Gibson emphasized that the Rule 
does not impose a strong fact-pleading requirement,123 Judge 
Easterbrook reprimanded the district judge for granting the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss: “It is disappointing to see a federal 
district judge dismiss a complaint for failure to adhere to a fact-
pleading model that federal practice abrogated almost 70 years 
ago.”124 
There were numerous other cases prior to Twombly in which the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s 
dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 
12(b)(6).125 Just two weeks after Judge Easterbrook handed down his 
decision in Vincent, however, the Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
122 Id. at 923–24. 
123 Id. at 924. 
124 Id. 
125 See, e.g., id. at n.† (citing twelve cases in the year prior to Vincent in which 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed decisions that had dismissed 
complaints for failure to state a claim: Christensen v. Boone County, 483 F.3d 454, 
465–66 (7th Cir. 2007); Miller v. Fisher, 2007 WL 755187 (7th Cir. Mar. 12, 2007); 
Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827 (7th Cir. 2007); Thomas v. Kalu, 2007 WL 648312 
(7th Cir. 2007); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Broadspire Servs., Inc., 209 F. App’x 573 (7th 
Cir. 2006); Tompkins v. The Women's Cmty., Inc., 203 F. App’x 743 (7th Cir. 
2006); McCann v. Neilsen, 466 F.3d 619 (7th Cir. 2006); Hefferman v. Bass, 467 
F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2006); Pratt v. Tarr, 464 F.3d 730 (7th Cir. 2006); Floyd v. Aden, 
184 F. App’x. 575 (7th Cir. 2006); Simpson v. Nickel, 450 F.3d 303 (7th Cir. 2006); 
Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
 17
17
Grattan: The Gatekeepers Keep Changing the Locks: <em>Swanson v. Citibank<
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 6, Issue 1                            Fall 2010 
 
B. Seventh Circuit Cases Following Twombly but Preceding Iqbal 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit took a narrow view 
of Twombly prior to Iqbal.126 In many instances, the court relied on 
Erickson v. Pardus to support its narrow reading.127 The court’s 
interpretation of Twombly in Airborne Beepers & Video v. AT&T 
Mobility provides a good example of this.128 In Airborne, the plaintiff 
sued a cell phone service provider for breach of an “authorized dealer 
agreement” after the provider stopped paying commissions on 
activations of new cell phone plans.129 After the district court 
dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint four times over the course of three 
years, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a fourth 
amended complaint.130 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit affirmed.131  
Writing for the court in Airborne, Judge Diane Wood addressed 
the standard for pleadings under Rule 8(a)(2) following Twombly.132 
Judge Wood noted that the Supreme Court in Twombly held that a 
complaint must not contain merely “labels and conclusions” or “a 
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”133 But Judge 
Wood went on to say that the Court’s decision in Erickson, decided 
two weeks after Twombly, confirmed that liberal notice pleading had 
                                                 
126 Riley v. Vilsack, 665 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1000–01 (W.D. Wis. 2009) (“The 
court of appeals acknowledged that Twombly ‘retooled federal pleading 
standards,’ . . . but in most cases the court declined to revisit previous holdings in 
light of the new case, adhering to the view that Rule 8 required nothing more than 
‘fair notice.’”). 
127 E.g., Doss v. Clearwater Title Co., 551 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Erickson v. Pardus . . . put to rest any concern that 
Twombly signaled an end to notice pleading in the federal courts.”). 
128 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2007). 
129 Id. at 664. 
130 Id. at 664–66. 
131 Id. at 668. 
132 Id. at 667. 
133 Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 
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not been replaced by a fact-pleading regime.134 Thus, in Judge Wood’s 
view, lack of plausibility under Twombly merely equated to a 
complaint that was “so sketchy” as to provide insufficient notice of the 
nature of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests.135 Because the 
appellant did not raise this issue on appeal, however, Judge Wood 
affirmed the district court on other grounds.136 
EEOC v. Concentra Health Services, Inc.137 is another interesting 
post-Twombly case; however, in Concentra, the complaint failed to 
meet the liberal notice pleading standard despite the Seventh Circuit’s 
narrow reading of Twombly.138 In Concentra, an employee had filed a 
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC), alleging that Concentra fired him in retaliation for reporting 
two co-workers’ sexual affair.139 The EEOC subsequently filed suit 
against Concentra for retaliatory discharge in violation of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act.140 The district court dismissed the original 
complaint because it held that the employee’s report of the affair was 
not protected under Title VII.141 The EEOC subsequently filed an 
amended complaint, which was “markedly less detailed” and that did 
not include the specific facts contained in the employee’s report to the 
EEOC.142 The district court dismissed the amended complaint for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the 
                                                 
134 Id.  
135 Judge Wood concluded as follows: “Taking Erickson and Twombly 
together, we understand the Court to be saying only that at some point the factual 
detail in a complaint may be so sketchy that the complaint does not provide the type 
of notice of the claim to which the defendant is entitled under Rule 8.” Id. 
136 Id. 
137 496 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2007). 
138 Id. at 781. 
139 Id. at 775. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
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EEOC appealed.143 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed.144 
Judge Cudahy wrote the majority opinion and held that the 
complaint failed to provide the notice required under Rule 8(a)(2).145 
Judge Cudahy read Twombly “to impose two easy-to-clear hurdles.”146 
The first hurdle is to meet Conley’s requirement of giving the 
defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it 
rests.147 The second hurdle is to plead factual allegations that bring the 
plaintiff’s claim beyond the “speculative” level to the level of 
“plausible.”148  
Applying this standard to the plaintiff’s complaint in Concentra, 
Judge Cudahy addressed the second hurdle first.149 Surprisingly, Judge 
Cudahy suggested that the EEOC had not failed to state a plausible 
claim even with its barebones complaint.150 Instead, Judge Cudahy 
reasoned that plausibility was a low threshold.151 Referring to the facts 
of Erickson v. Pardus, Judge Cudahy reasoned that the plaintiff’s 
retaliation claim seemed “no less plausible than that a prison doctor 
might improperly withhold desperately needed medication.”152 Thus, 
just like Judge Wood in Airborne,153 Judge Cudahy relied on Erickson 
v. Pardus to support a narrow reading of Twombly.154 
                                                 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 781. 
146 Id. at 776. 
147 Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 
148 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 
149 Id. at 777. 
150 See id. at 777–79. This was in part because “Concentra does not contend 
that the bare allegations of the amended complaints’ seventh paragraph fail to 
plausibly suggest a right to relief.” Id. at 777. 
151 Id. at 777 n.1. 
152 Id.; see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 89–91 (2007). 
153 Airborne Beepers & Video v. AT&T Mobility, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 
2007). 
154 Concentra, 496 F.3d at 777 n.1. 
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Returning to the first hurdle, Judge Cudahy then wrote that a 
complaint must contain “very minimal” factual detail to satisfy the 
notice requirements of Rule 8(a)(2).155 Judge Cudahy held that the 
EEOC’s complaint was too minimal to provide fair notice, however.156 
He pointed out that, after the EEOC’s original complaint had been 
dismissed for failure to state a claim, the EEOC had merely deleted 
information from its complaint to “disguise the nature of the claim 
before the court.”157 Judge Cudahy wrote that this practice of 
“obfuscation” was inconsistent with the principles of notice pleading, 
and, therefore, the complaint was properly dismissed.158 
While the court’s holding in Concentra that the EEOC’s 
complaint did not provide sufficient notice because it was too vague 
and obfuscated seems correct, Concentra says a lot about the Seventh 
Circuit’s view of plausibility following Twombly. Judge Cudahy 
suggested that the EEOC’s barebones complaint159 stated a plausible 
claim160 even though the complaint was too vague to provide fair 
notice.161 This suggests that, even though Judge Cudahy saw the two 
“hurdles” facing pleadings to be “easy to clear,” he may have 
considered providing fair notice to be a higher hurdle than stating a 
                                                 
155 Id. at 779 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) 
(stating that the “classic verbal formulation” of Rule 8(a)(2)’s requirements is that 
the complaint “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests”). 
156 Id. at 781. 
157 Id. at 780. 
158 Id. at 780–81. 
159 Id. at 780 (“The claim itself was set forth in less than a page and the critical 
details were contained in a single eight-line paragraph, the very paragraph targeted 
for excision in the amended complaint.”). 
160 Id. at 777 n.1. 
161 Id. at 781. 
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plausible claim.162 This is contrary to the widely held view that the 
Supreme Court raised the bar when it decided Twombly.163 
In one last post-Twombly, pre-Iqbal case, Judge Posner adhered to 
a fairly narrow reading of Twombly but held that it applied it to a 
complex case brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO).164 The court’s holding in Limestone 
Development Corp. v. Village of Lemont, Illinois comports with the 
view—which was widely held prior to Iqbal—that Twombly’s holding 
applied only to complex cases. In Limestone, the plaintiff sued a 
number of defendants, including the village in which his property was 
located, the mayor of the village, and the local park district, for acting 
in concert to prevent the plaintiff from developing his property, which 
resulted in the sale of the property at a loss.165 The plaintiff alleged 
that the defendants’ coordinated conduct violated RICO.166 The 
district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, and 
the court of appeals affirmed.167 
Judge Posner reasoned that, although Twombly “must not be over-
read,” the principle underlying its holding is that defendants “should 
not be forced to undergo costly discovery” unless a complaint shows 
“that the plaintiff has a substantial case.”168 Judge Posner held that this 
principle is applicable to a RICO case, which is complex like the 
antitrust case that was the subject of Twombly.169 Judge Posner held 
that dismissal of the complaint was proper because the plaintiff’s 
allegations were “threadbare” and contained no indication of “a 
                                                 
162 See id. at 776–77, 777 n.1, 780–81. 
163 See e.g., Swanson v. Citibank, 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[t]he 
question with which courts are still struggling is how much higher the Supreme 
Court meant to set the bar”). 
164 Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, Ill., 520 F.3d 797, 799 (7th Cir. 
2008). 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 802–05. 
168 Id. at 802–03. 
169 Id. at 803. 
 22
22
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 2
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol6/iss1/2
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 6, Issue 1                            Fall 2010 
 
structure of any kind,” which is necessary to state a claim under 
RICO.170 
 
C. Seventh Circuit Cases Following Iqbal 
 
After the Supreme Court held in Ashcroft v. Iqbal that Twombly’s 
plausibility requirement applies “to all civil actions,”171 one would 
imagine that courts would stop reading Twombly narrowly. However, 
in Smith v. Duffey, one of the first Seventh Circuit cases decided 
following Iqbal, Judge Posner continued to take a narrow view of 
Twombly and declined to apply either Twombly or Iqbal to the facts of 
the case.172 In Smith, the plaintiff sued his former employer for fraud 
in connection with cancellation of stock options in the employer’s 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization.173 Prior to his employer’s 
bankruptcy, the plaintiff had signed a termination agreement and 
received a $1.4 million severance.174 After he discovered that his stock 
options were extinguished in the reorganization, the employee sued.175 
He alleged that, had the defendants told him that his stock options 
were to be extinguished in the bankruptcy, he would have demanded a 
higher severance.176 The district court dismissed the complaint for 
failure to state a claim, and the court of appeals affirmed.177 
Writing for the majority, Judge Posner held that the plaintiff had 
not stated a claim for fraud where he was in a weak bargaining 
position and where it would have been highly unlikely that he could 
have demanded a higher severance in exchange for his stock 
                                                 
170 Id. at 803–05. 
171 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009). 
172 See Smith v. Duffey, 576 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2009) (“So maybe neither 
Bell Atlantic nor Iqbal governs here. It doesn’t matter.”). 
173 Id. at 336–37. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 337. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 336, 339. 
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options.178 Judge Posner reasoned that the stock options were 
valueless at the time the plaintiff received his severance and that any 
reasonable businessperson would have known this.179 Judge Posner 
did not rely on Twombly or Iqbal, but instead reasoned that it was 
apparent from the plaintiff’s complaint and arguments alone “that h
case has no 180
is 
 merit.”  
wly. 
                                                
Even if the inadequacy of the plaintiff’s complaint was apparent, 
Smith is significant because of Judge Posner’s proposed narrow 
reading of Twombly and Iqbal.181 In declining to apply either Twombly 
or Iqbal to the facts of Smith, Judge Posner suggested that Twombly 
was limited to complex litigation cases182 and that Iqbal was limited to 
cases in which the defendant had pleaded a defense of official 
immunity.183 This reading is consistent with the court’s trend pre-
Iqbal of reading Twombly narro
 
178 Id. at 338–39. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at 339–40. 
181 See, e.g., Boroff v. Alza Corp., 685 F. Supp. 2d 704, 707 (N.D. Ohio 2010) 
(citing Smith, 576 F.3d at 339–40) (“Questions as to the scope of the Iqbal and 
Twombly pleading standards have generated much discussion among lawyers and 
judges of late. . . . Judge Posner’s proposed (narrow) reading of Iqbal and Twombly 
holds obvious appeal to lawyers and judges familiar with the venerable Conley 
pleading standard. But it cannot be reconciled with the clear statement in Iqbal that 
the Twombly standard applies to ‘all civil actions’”). 
182 Smith, 576 F.3d at 339–340 (“In our initial thinking about the case, 
however, we were reluctant to endorse the district court’s citation of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in [Twombly], fast becoming the citation du jour in Rule 12(b)(6) 
cases, as authority for the dismissal of this suit. The Court held that in complex 
litigation . . . the defendant is not to be put to the cost of pretrial discovery . . . unless 
the complaint says enough about the case to permit an inference that it may have real 
merit. The present case, however, is not complex.”). 
183 Id. at 340 (noting that Iqbal had extended the holding of Twombly to all 
civil cases, but that, nonetheless, “Iqbal is special in its own way, because the 
defendants had pleaded a defense of official immunity and the Court said that the 
promise of minimally intrusive discovery ‘provides especially cold comfort in this 
pleading context”) (emphasis in original). 
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By the time the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided 
Cooney v. Rossiter,184 Judge Posner had become slightly more willing 
to rely upon Twombly and Iqbal.185 In Cooney, after the plaintiff lost 
custody of her two children in a state court child custody proceeding, 
she brought a § 1983 action pro se against the state court judge who 
presided over the proceeding, against the court-appointed children’s 
representative, and against the court-appointed children’s 
psychiatrist.186 During the child custody proceeding, the state court 
judge had found that the plaintiff suffered from Munchausen 
syndrome by proxy, which is a disorder in which “an individual 
produces or feigns physical or emotional symptoms in another person 
under his or her care.”187 Based upon this finding, the judge had 
granted custody to the children’s father.188 In her subsequent federal 
case, the mother alleged that the defendants had conspired together to 
deprive her of numerous constitutional rights.189 The district court 
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, and the plaintiff 
appealed.190 
Judge Posner wrote for the court and affirmed the district court’s 
dismissal of the complaint.191 In reaching his holding, Judge Posner 
took a slightly less narrow reading of Twombly and Iqbal than he had 
in Smith v. Duffey.192 However, even though Judge Posner 
acknowledged that Iqbal extended Twombly’s plausibility requirement 
                                                 
184 583 F.3d 967 (7th Cir. 2009). 
185 See id. at 971 (applying Twombly and Iqbal to a complaint alleging civil 
conspiracy). 
186 Id. at 969. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 970. 
190 Id. at 969. 
191 Id. at 972. 
192 Compare Smith v. Duffey, 576 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2009) (limiting 
Twombly to complex cases and Iqbal to cases involving the defense of official 
immunity), with Cooney, 583 F.3d at 971 (holding that the decision whether to apply 
Twombly and Iqbal “is relative to the circumstances” and is not strictly limited to 
those two situations). 
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“to litigation in general,”193 he did not take this to mean that the same 
level of plausibility applies to all civil cases.194 Instead, Judge Posner 
reasoned that “the height of the pleading requirement is relative to the 
circumstances.”195 
Under the circumstances of Cooney, Judge Posner felt that a high 
standard of plausibility was warranted.196 Judge Posner saw Cooney as 
a case in which a “paranoid pro se” alleged that the parties involved in 
a contentious child custody battle were guilty of a “vast [and] 
encompassing conspiracy.”197 Judge Posner held that, under these 
circumstances, the complaint did not meet the requisite level of 
plausibility and, therefore, was properly dismissed.198 
Finally, in Brooks v. Ross, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit continued to take a fairly narrow reading of Twombly and Iqbal 
but affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a complaint.199 In Brooks, 
the plaintiff brought a § 1983 action against members of the Illinois 
Prison Review Board (PRB) and other state officials for malicious 
prosecution, civil conspiracy, and other claims.200 The plaintiff alleged 
that the defendants had conspired to indict him on charges of official 
misconduct and wire fraud in connection with a 2002 PRB hearing, of 
which the plaintiff was later acquitted.201 The district court dismissed 
the complaint for failure to state a claim, and the court of appeals 
affirmed.202 
The opinion that Judge Diane Wood wrote for the court in Brooks 
was reminiscent of her pre-Iqbal opinions. Judge Wood held that the 
plaintiff’s allegations of conspiracy and malicious prosecution did not 
                                                 
193 Cooney, 583 F.3d at 971. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 972. 
199 578 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2009). 
200 Id. at 577–78. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 578, 582. 
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state a claim upon which relief could be granted.203 In reaching this 
holding, Judge Wood reasoned that the allegations were too 
conclusory and formulaic to give the defendants fair notice of the 
plaintiff’s claims and the grounds upon which they rested.204 Judge 
Wood’s emphasis on the notice pleading aspect of Twombly and Iqbal 
was similar to her approach in prior cases in which she interpreted 
Twombly’s plausibility requirement to mean that some allegations may 
be “so sketchy or implausible” that they fail to give sufficient 
notice.205 
 
III. THE DEBATE HEATS UP: SWANSON V. CITIBANK 
 
Until recently, the differing interpretations of Twombly and Iqbal 
espoused by the judges on the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit had not directly clashed. But that changed in Swanson v. 
Citibank, where the plaintiff sued Citibank, a real estate appraisal 
company, and the appraisal company’s employee for discrimination in 
violation of the Fair Housing Act206 after Citibank denied her 
application for a home-equity loan.207 The pro se plaintiff alleged that 
the defendants had discriminated against her on the basis of race by 
under-appraising her home for the purpose of denying her loan 
application.208 The district court granted the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) 
                                                 
203 Id. at 581–82. 
204 Id. 
205 See Airborne Beepers & Video v. AT&T Mobility, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (“Taking Erickson and Twombly together, we understand the Court to be 
saying only that at some point the factual detail in a complaint may be so sketchy 
that the complaint does not provide the type of notice of the claim to which the 
defendant is entitled under Rule 8.”); see also Doss v. Clearwater Title Co., 551 F.3d 
634, 639 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Erickson v. Pardus . . . 
put to rest any concern that Twombly signaled an end to notice pleading in the 
federal courts.”). 
206 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (2006). 
207 Swanson v. Citibank, 614 F.3d 400, 402 (7th Cir. 2010). 
208 Id. 
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motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals reversed.209 The court of 
appeals held that, under Twombly and Iqbal, the plaintiff’s complaint 
sufficiently stated a plausible claim upon which relief could be 
granted.210 
Judge Diane Wood wrote for the majority in Swanson and read 
Twombly and Iqbal very liberally.211 Although Judge Wood’s reading 
of Twombly and Iqbal did not change significantly from prior cases, 
she stated her position more strongly than she had before. First, Judge 
Wood began by acknowledging that courts are still struggling to 
determine “how much higher the Supreme Court meant to set the bar” 
when it decided Twomby and Iqbal.212 She then repeated her oft-stated 
position that, following the trio of Twombly, Erickson, and Iqbal, 
notice pleading is still the applicable standard in federal courts.213 
Next, she reasoned that notice pleading “is the light in which” 
Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility requirement must be read.214 Judge 
Wood held that, reading Twombly and Iqbal in this light, a complaint 
must only include sufficient factual detail “to present a story that holds 
together.”215 Judge Wood explained that, in assessing this, judges 
should ask themselves “could these things have happened, not did they 
happen.”216 
Judge Wood further supported her liberal reading of Twombly and 
Iqbal by reasoning that “[t]he Supreme Court’s explicit decision to 
reaffirm the validity of Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, which was cited with 
approval in Twombly, indicates that in many straightforward cases, it 
will not be any more difficult today for a plaintiff to meet [the 
                                                 
209 Id. at 402, 407. 
210 Id. at 402–07. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the 
plaintiff’s common-law fraud claims because her complaint failed to plead facts with 
the particularity required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9. Id. at 406. 
211 See id. at 402–07. 
212 Id. at 403 (citations omitted). 
213 Id. at 404. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. 
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requirements of notice pleading] . . . than it was before the Court’s 
recent decisions.”217 This may not be true in complex cases, Judge 
Wood acknowledged, because complex cases “require more detail, 
both to give the opposing party notice of what the case is all about and 
to show how, in the plaintiff’s mind at least, the dots should be 
connected.”218 
Applying her liberal reading of Twombly and Iqbal to the facts of 
Swanson, Judge Wood held that the plaintiff’s complaint was 
sufficiently detailed.219 Judge Wood reasoned that the plaintiff’s 
complaint, which identified the type of discrimination, who was 
responsible for it, and when it occurred, included all it needed to give 
the defendants fair notice of the claim and, thus, to survive a motion to 
dismiss.220 
In dissent, Judge Richard Posner criticized the majority’s reading 
of Twomby and Iqbal and, in a departure from prior cases, advocated 
for a broader application of Twomby and Iqbal.221 Instead of following 
the narrow reading of Iqbal that he formulated in Smith v. Duffy222 and 
promulgated in Cooney v. Rossiter,223 Judge Posner seemed to agree 
this time that Iqbal was not limited to cases involving the defense of 
qualified immunity, reasoning that the language of the Iqbal opinion 
suggests that Iqbal was “a strong case for application of the Twombly 
standard, rather than . . . the only type of discrimination case to which 
the standard applies.”224 
Next, Judge Posner criticized the majority’s liberal reading of 
Twombly and Iqbal. Judge Posner wrote that the majority’s reading 
suggests “that discrimination cases are outside the scope of Iqbal, 
                                                 
217 Id. (citations omitted) 
218 Id. at 405. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. at 407–12 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
222 576 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2009). 
223 583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009). 
224 Swanson, 614 F.3d at 407 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
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itself a discrimination case.”225 Judge Posner pointed out that the 
majority’s opinion distinguished between simple discrimination cases, 
of which the majority required minimal allegations to survive a motion 
to dismiss, and complex cases, of which the majority required more 
detailed allegations.226 Judge Posner agreed that requiring more detail 
for the complex cases made sense, because Twombly itself was a 
complex case.227 But Judge Posner suggested that it was illogical to 
lower the bar for even straightforward discrimination claims, because 
Iqbal was a discrimination case, and it “was not especially 
complex.”228 
Judge Posner went on to offer his own interpretation of Twombly 
and Iqbal’s plausibility requirement. He read Twombly and Iqbal to 
mean that a complaint must contain sufficient allegations to defeat any 
“obvious alternative explanation” for the plaintiff’s injury.229 In this 
case, Judge Posner saw error to be an obvious alternative explanation 
for the defendant’s denial of the plaintiff’s loan application.230 He 
reasoned that “errors in appraising houses are common because ‘real 
estate appraisal is not an exact science.’”231 Therefore, Judge Posner 
concluded that the allegation of discrimination was not plausible and 
that the district court’s dismissal should have been affirmed.232 
Based on Judge Posner’s dissent in Swanson, it is clear that his 
interpretation of Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility requirement has 
continued to evolve. In Smith v. Duffy, Judge Posner seemed unwilling 
to apply Iqbal outside of the qualified immunity context at all.233 In 
Cooney v. Rossiter, Judge Posner held that a heightened plausibility 
                                                 
225 Id. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. at 407–08. 
228 Id. at 408. 
229 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951–52). 
230 Id. at 408–09. 
231 Id. at 408 (quoting Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 715 
(7th Cir. 1998)). 
232 Id. at 407–12. 
233 576 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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standard made sense in the case of a “paranoid pro se” whose lawsuit 
threatened multiple defendants with costly discovery.234 But in 
Swanson, Judge Posner’s dissent suggested that a heightened 
plausibility requirement should be imposed in even the simplest of 
discrimination cases.235 No longer is Judge Posner advocating for a 
narrow reading of Twombly and Iqbal.236 Instead, the reading that 
Judge Posner advocates in Swanson is reminiscent of the “robust 
gatekeeping regime” that Professors Clermont and Yeazell warn us 
about237—if the plaintiff’s complaint does not contain sufficient 
factual allegations to override any other natural, legal explanation for 
the plaintiff’s injury, the complaint will be dismissed and the gates 
closed.238 
 
IV. SETTLING THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DEBATE OVER THE 
PLAUSIBILITY REQUIREMENT 
 
In 1928, Judge Charles E. Clark said that “[i]n pleading, an 
eternal dilemma presents itself: How shall we make procedural rules 
definite enough to work and yet flexible enough to do justice?”239 
Judge Clark’s observation has stood the test of time, because the 
United States Supreme Court is clearly still grappling with that 
dilemma. In 2007, the Supreme Court thought that the standard for 
pleading had become too flexible, because in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, it raised the bar by jettisoning Conley v. Gibson’s “no set of 
facts” language240 and replacing it with a heightened plausibility 
requirement.241 But, as Seventh Circuit Judge Diane Wood recently 
pointed out in Swanson v. Citibank, “courts are still struggling [with] 
                                                 
234 583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009). 
235 Swanson, 614 F.3d at 407–12 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
236 Id. at 407. 
237 See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 22, at 823 
238 Swanson, 614 F.3d at 408 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
239 CLARK, supra note 35, at vii. 
240 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).  
241 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563–70 (2007). 
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how much higher the Supreme Court meant to set the bar.”242 
According to Judge Wood’s majority opinion in Swanson, the Court 
did not raise the bar very much.243 According to Judge Richard 
Posner’s dissent in the same case, however, the Court raised the bar 
significantly.244 Which view is a better one—the one that gives 
pleading rules more bite, or the one that keeps them flexible? Put 
another way, should federal courts keep the gates relatively wide open, 
or should they lock them up? 
 
A. The Two Competing Interpretations: Judge Wood’s “Could this 
Have Happened?” View Versus Judge Posner’s “Obvious Alternative 
Explanation” View  
 
The disagreement between the majority and dissenting opinions in 
Swanson v. Citibank can be characterized as a debate over which one 
of two views should prevail. One view, adopted by Judge Wood in 
Swanson, interprets Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility requirement to 
mean that the allegations contained in a complaint must set forth a 
scenario that could have happened (i.e., the claim to relief is plausible 
because the scenario alleged in the complaint could have occurred).245 
The other view, adopted by Judge Posner in his dissent in Swanson, 
interprets Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility requirement to mean that a 
complaint’s allegations must contain sufficient factual detail to 
override any “obvious alternative explanation” for the defendant’s 
conduct (i.e., the claim to relief is plausible because there is not a more 
                                                 
242 Swanson, 614 F.3d at 403. 
243 See id. at 404 (“As we understand it, the Court is saying that the plaintiff 
must give enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that 
holds together.”). 
244 See id. at 408 (Posner, J., dissenting) (“The Supreme Court would consider 
error the plausible inference in this case, rather than discrimination, for it said in 
Iqbal that ‘as between that ‘obvious alternative explanation’ for the [injury of which 
the plaintiff is complaining] and the purposeful, invidious discrimination [the 
plaintiff] asks us to infer, discrimination is not a plausible conclusion.’”). 
245 Id. at 404. 
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natural, lawful explanation for the plaintiff’s injury).246 Thus, the 
central debate concerns whether Judge Wood’s “could this have 
happened?” view or Judge Posner’s “obvious alternative explanation” 
view should prevail. 
Providing a framework that helps to harmonize these competing 
views, Professor Allan Ides has broken down the principles underlying 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) into three separate 
requirements.247 The first principle, “transactional sufficiency,” is the 
idea that a complaint must include sufficient factual detail to move the 
claim beyond an “abstract assertion of a right” to a claim that is 
“premised on an actual, identifiable event.”248 The second principle, 
“procedural sufficiency,” is the idea that a complaint should include 
sufficient factual detail to give the opposing party fair notice of the 
claim and the grounds upon which it rests (this is Conley v. Gibson’s 
notice requirement).249 The third and final principle, “substantive 
sufficiency,” is the idea that the complaint’s factual allegations should 
be sufficient to give rise to a recognized legal claim.250 
Using Ides’s framework, Judge Diane Wood’s “could this have 
happened?” view and Judge Richard Posner’s “obvious alternative 
explanation” view differ significantly in the level of emphasis that 
they place on “transactional sufficiency,” “procedural sufficiency,” 
and “substantive sufficiency.” Judge Wood’s view emphasizes 
“transactional sufficiency” and “procedural sufficiency.” When Judge 
Wood writes that Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility requirement means 
that a complaint must provide enough factual detail “to present a story 
that holds together,”251 she asks for a minimal indication that the 
complaint’s claim to relief is “premised on an actual, identifiable 
                                                 
246 Id. at 408 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
247 Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Federal 
Pleading Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604, 607 (2007). 
248 Id. 
249 Id. 
250 Id. 
251 Swanson, 614 F.3d at 404. 
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event.”252 Under this approach, if it appears from the complaint’s 
factual allegations that the underlying event could have happened, then 
the complaint is sufficient.253  
But Judge Wood’s view of the requisite “transactional 
sufficiency” must be interpreted in light of Twombly and Iqbal’s 
holdings. Although the Court in Iqbal said that the “plausibility 
standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’”254 and although 
the Court in Twombly said that “a well-pleaded complaint may 
proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts 
is improbable”255—both of which support Judge Wood’s liberal 
reading of the cases—the Court in Iqbal went on to say that 
plausibility “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has 
acted unlawfully.”256 So, in order to read Judge Wood’s majority 
opinion in harmony with Twombly and Iqbal, one must read it as 
requiring more than sheer possibility. One must read her inquiry—
“could this have happened?”—as referring to the line that divides 
sheer possibility from plausibility. Judge Wood premised her holding 
in Swanson by stating that “[i]t is by now well established that a 
plaintiff must do better than putting a few words on paper that, in the 
hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has 
happened to her that might be redressed by the law.”257 Thus, we can 
interpret Judge Wood as equating the term “might” with sheer 
plausibility, which is insufficient to state a plausible claim, and 
equating the term “could” with plausibility, which is sufficient. 
Additionally, as mentioned several times already, Judge Wood’s 
reading of Twomby and Iqbal places much emphasis on the principle 
of “procedural sufficiency.” In nearly every one of her post-Twomby 
cases, Judge Wood has focused her interpretation of “plausibility” on 
whether the plaintiff’s complaint provides sufficient factual detail to 
                                                 
252 Ides, supra note 247, at 607. 
253 Swanson, 614 F.3d at 404. 
254 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). 
255 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). 
256 Id. 
257 Swanson, 614 F.3d at 403. 
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give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which 
it rests.258 
Judge Posner’s “obvious alternative explanation” view, on the 
other hand, focuses more on “substantive sufficiency” than 
“transactional sufficiency” or “procedural sufficiency.” For example, 
Judge Posner described his view of the line dividing sheer possibility 
and plausibility this way: 
 
In statistics the range of probabilities is from 0 to 1, and 
therefore encompasses “sheer possibility” along with 
“plausibility.” It seems . . . what the Court was driving at was 
that even if the district judge doesn’t think a plaintiff’s case is 
more likely than not to be a winner (that is, doesn’t think p > 
.5), as long as it is substantially justified that’s enough to 
avert dismissal.259 
 
But what does Judge Posner mean by “substantially justified”? We 
must read this in context with his view that Twombly and Iqbal require 
courts to dismiss as implausible any claim to relief that is based upon 
an injury that has an “obvious alternative explanation.”260 So, in Judge 
Posner’s view, it is not sufficient for a complaint to merely give an 
indication that the plaintiff’s claim is “premised on an actual, 
identifiable event” or to give the defendant notice of the claim and the 
grounds upon which it rests.261 Instead, the complaint’s factual 
allegations must be sufficiently detailed to override any more natural, 
                                                 
258 See Airborne Beepers & Video v. AT&T Mobility, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (“Taking Erickson and Twombly together, we understand the Court to be 
saying only that at some point the factual detail in a complaint may be so sketchy 
that the complaint does not provide the type of notice of the claim to which the 
defendant is entitled under Rule 8.”); see also Doss v. Clearwater Title Co., 551 F.3d 
634, 639 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Erickson v. Pardus . . . 
put to rest any concern that Twombly signaled an end to notice pleading in the 
federal courts.”). 
259 Swanson, 614 F.3d at 411 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
260 See id. at 408. 
261 See Ides, supra note 247, at 607. 
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legal explanation for the plaintiff’s injury.262 Because a plaintiff’s 
injury that has an obvious natural explanation that does not involve 
wrongful conduct would not give rise to a recognized legal claim, one 
can see that Judge Posner’s “obvious alternative explanation” view 
places most of its emphasis on “substantive sufficiency.”263 Notably, 
Judge Wood directly disagreed with Judge Posner’s emphasis on 
heightened substantive sufficiency: She wrote that plausibility “does 
not imply that the district court should decide whose version to 
believe, or which version is more likely than not.”264 
 
B. The Problem with “Judicial Experience and Common Sense” 
 
Professor Suja A. Thomas has argued that, following Twombly 
and Iqbal, the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss has become the “new 
summary judgment motion.”265 Professor Thomas bases her argument, 
in part, on judges’ tendency following Twombly and Iqbal to rely on 
their own opinions of the sufficiency of the evidence to decide 
motions to dismiss.266 The language from Iqbal that courts must look 
to their “judicial experience and common sense”267 to decide a motion 
to dismiss encourages judges to look beyond allegations of a 
complaint to decide whether the claim is plausible.268 This practice, 
which is apparent in Judge Posner’s dissent in Swanson,269 is 
problematic because it tends to transform a motion to dismiss into a 
                                                 
262 Swanson, 614 F.3d at 408. 
263 See Ides, supra note 247, at 607. Substantive sufficiency requires that the 
complaint “allege facts sufficient to show that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. 
264 Swanson, 614 F.3d at 404. 
265 Thomas, supra note 19, at 17. 
266 Id. at 31, 41. 
267 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. 
268 Thomas, supra note 19, at 31 (“This language in Iqbal seems to permit 
judges to use their own opinions to assess the sufficiency of facts to decide motions 
to dismiss similar to what we see judges do in deciding summary judgment.”). 
269 See Swanson, 614 F.3d at 407–12 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
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motion for summary judgment, thus giving judges too much power 
over the parties at an early stage in the litigation.270 
 
1. Comparison of Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 
 
On their faces, the standards for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 
and for a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment are very different.271 
Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a court may dismiss a complaint on motion 
for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”272 Rule 
56 provides that summary judgment “should be rendered if . . . there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the movant is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.”273 Rule 12(b)(6) focuses on defects 
on the face of a pleading, while Rule 56 focuses on the lack of 
disputed material facts underlying a controv 274ersy.  
                                                
Judges are also to consider different things when deciding the 
motions.275 Traditionally, when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss, judges are to look only to the allegations contained within the 
four corners of the complaint.276 The court is to assume as true all 
well-pleaded facts, although not legal conclusions,277 and then to 
 
270 Thomas, supra note 19, at 31. 
271 Id. at 28. 
272 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
273 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2). 
274 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2). 
275 Thomas, supra note 19, at 28. 
276 Karagiannis v. Allcare Dental Mgmt., LLC, No. 10-2085, 2010 WL 
3724767, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 2010) (citing Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith 
Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993)) (“When considering a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court is limited to the allegations contained in 
the pleadings.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) 
or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the 
court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”). 
277 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. 
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (holding that, “[a]lthough for the purposes 
of a motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as 
true, we ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual 
allegation’”). 
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determine if those facts “state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.”278 If the parties present facts outside of the pleadings in 
support of or in opposition to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the 
court is to treat the motion as one for summary judgment.279 
When deciding a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, 
on the other hand, a court is to look to “the pleadings, the discovery 
and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits.”280 Judges are not 
limited to the four corners of the complaint but are to examine all of 
the evidence that has been developed through discovery.281 If these 
materials reveal a “genuine issue of material fact,” then summary 
judgment is improper.282 A genuine issue of material fact exists “if the 
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 
nonmoving party.”283 
 
2. Convergence of Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
 
Professor Thomas argues that Twombly and Iqbal threaten to 
convert the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into the new motion for 
summary judgment.284 She provides three similarities between the 
motion to dismiss following Twombly and Iqbal and the motion for 
summary judgment.285 First, following Twombly and Iqbal, a 
complaint must state a claim that is plausible,286 which is also a 
standard that the Supreme Court has used in deciding summary 
                                                 
278 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
279 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). 
280 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2). 
281 Id. 
282 Id. 
283 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
284 Thomas, supra note 19, at 17. 
285 Id. at 29–31. 
286 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
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judgment motions.287 Professor Thomas points out that, in Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court cited one of its seminal 
summary judgment opinions, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp.,288 as support for its new plausibility 
requirement.289 In Matsushita, the Supreme Court held, in part, that 
summary judgment was proper and that there was no genuine issue of 
material fact concerning the plaintiff’s allegations of antitrust 
conspiracy where it was “equally plausible” based on the evidence 
presented that the defendants’ conduct was entirely legal.290  
The second similarity is that judges tend to draw inferences in 
favor of both the moving and the non-moving parties when deciding 
both motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment.291 
Professor Thomas points to the Court’s decision in Matsushita, in 
which it held that, although a court must view “the inferences to be 
drawn from the underlying facts . . . in the light most favorable” to the 
non-moving party, it must view these inferences “in light of the 
competing inferences.”292 Professor Thomas also points to the Court’s 
decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, in which the Court drew inferences in 
favor of the parties moving for dismissal as well as the non-moving 
parties.293 In Twombly, the Court drew the inference in favor of the 
moving party that the defendants’ conduct was consistent with 
uncoordinated monopolistic behavior.294 In Iqbal, the Court drew the 
inference in favor of the moving party that the defendants’ policy of 
arresting Arab-Americans was consistent with a “nondiscriminatory 
intent” to detain aliens who were illegally in the United States and 
                                                 
287 Thomas, supra note 19, at 29 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)). 
288 475 U.S. 574. 
289 Thomas, supra note 19, at 25 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561 n.7). 
290 Id. at 20 (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588). 
291 Id. at 30. 
292 Id. at 20 (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587–88). 
293 Id. at 25, 27 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567–69 n.13; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009)). 
294 See 550 U.S. at 568–70. 
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who had potential connections to the September 11 terrorist attacks.295 
The Court in Iqbal held that judges must use their “judicial experience 
and common sense” to draw these inferences and that a claim is 
plausible only when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 
for the misconduct alleged.”296 
The third similarity between the motion to dismiss following 
Twombly and Iqbal and the motion for summary judgment is judges’ 
reliance on their own opinions of the sufficiency of the evidence to 
decide the motions.297 Professor Thomas argues that judges deciding 
motions for summary judgment rely on their own opinions of the 
sufficiency of the evidence—judges use phrases like “a reasonable 
jury could find” but nonetheless often disagree over whether summary 
judgment is proper.298 Regarding motions to dismiss, on the other 
hand, the Supreme Court in Iqbal expressly stated that judges are to 
rely on their “judicial experience and common sense” to decide such 
motions.299 Professor Thomas quotes one commentator who criticized 
this language because “it obviously licenses highly subjective 
judgments . . . [t]his is a blank check for federal judges to get rid of 
cases they disfavor.”300 As discussed below, the invitation for judges 
to look to their “judicial experience and common sense” to decide 
motions to dismiss gives them too much power over parties at an early 
stage in litigation.301 
 
 
 
                                                 
295 See 129 S. Ct. at 1951. 
296 Thomas, supra note 19, at 27 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949–50). 
297 Id. at 31. 
298 Id. 
299 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. 
300 Thomas, supra note 19, at 32 (quoting Adam Liptak, Case About 9/11 
Could Lead to a Broad Shift on Civil Lawsuits, N.Y.TIMES, July 20, 2009, at A10). 
301 Id. at 41. 
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3. The Problem with Converting the Motion to Dismiss into a 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
 
As Professor Thomas argues, one important problem with 
converting the motion to dismiss into the “new summary judgment 
motion”302 is that the parties have not had the opportunity to develop 
evidence through discovery at the motion-to-dismiss stage.303 A judge 
deciding a motion for summary judgment examines all of the evidence 
that the parties have uncovered through discovery to determine 
whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether a 
“reasonable jury” could find for the non-movant.304 At this stage, the 
parties have had the opportunity to develop evidence through 
discovery and to present it to the judge in a persuasive manner.305 
At the motion-to-dismiss stage, on the other hand, the parties have 
not had the opportunity to develop evidence through discovery.306 The 
judge is limited to those factual allegations contained in the 
complaint.307 Asking a judge to determine whether those factual 
allegations present a plausible claim is akin to asking the judge to 
decide whether the evidence before him on a motion for summary 
judgment presents a genuine issue of material fact, but without the 
benefit of having fully-developed evidence before him.308 Therefore, 
when a judge is permitted to look to his or her “judicial experience and 
common sense” to determine plausibility, the judge is given great 
power over the parties.309 The judge is granted the power to draw 
inferences in favor of the defendant moving for dismissal based upon 
his or her opinion of the sufficiency of the scant allegations in the 
                                                 
302 Id.at 17. 
303 Id. at 41. 
304 Id.; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
305 Thomas, supra note 19, at 41. 
306 Id. 
307 Id. 
308 Id. 
309 Id. 
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complaint.310 The risk is that judges will dismiss cases that would 
have been plausible had the parties had the opportunity to develop 
evidence through discovery and present it to the j 311udge.  
                                                
 
C. An Argument for Judge Wood’s Interpretation of the Plausibility 
Requirement 
 
Analyzing the majority and dissenting opinions in Swanson using 
Professor Thomas’s “new summary judgment motion” argument and 
Professor Ides’s Rule 8(a)(2) framework leads to two conclusions. 
First, Judge Posner’s “obvious alternative explanation” view of 
Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility requirement gives judges too much 
power to rely on their own opinions of what is plausible and focuses 
too heavily on determinations of substantive sufficiency at the motion-
to-dismiss stage. Second, Judge Wood’s “could this have happened” 
view is better because it limits a court’s power to draw inferences in 
favor of the moving party and requires only a minimal, yet 
appropriate, amount of transactional and substantive sufficiency at the 
motion-to-dismiss stage. 
 
1. Judge Posner’s Interpretation Gives Judges Too Much Power over 
Parties at the Motion-to-Dismiss Stage 
 
Judge Posner’s interpretation of Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility 
requirement places too much power in the hands of judges when 
deciding motions to dismiss. In his dissent in Swanson, Judge Posner 
did exactly what Professor Thomas warns us about: He delved into an 
extensive discussion of matters beyond the allegations of the 
complaint to conclude that the plaintiff’s claim of discrimination was 
not plausible.312 Judge Posner looked to the frequency of errors in real 
estate appraisals and to the difficulty of obtaining credit as a result of 
 
310 Id. at 29–31, 41. 
311 Id. at 39. 
312 See Swanson v. Citibank, 614 F.3d 400, 408–09 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., 
dissenting). 
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the housing crisis.313 These are considerations that went beyond the 
complaint’s allegations and that would have been more properly 
considered in deciding a motion for summary judgment than a motion 
to dismiss.314 
Judge Posner also drew inferences in favor of the defendants 
moving for dismissal in Swanson. Although Judge Posner agreed that 
the court must assume to be true the plaintiff’s allegation that the 
defendants’ low appraisal of her home was a mistake, he immediately 
countered that assumption by drawing an inference in favor of the 
defendants.315 Judge Posner wrote that, although “[w]e must assume 
that the appraisal was a mistake, and the house is worth considerably 
more, . . . errors in appraising a house are common because ‘real estate 
is not an exact science.’”316 But why is error the more obvious 
inference in this case? Why does error so strongly outweigh 
discrimination as a plausible explanation for the defendants’ low 
appraisal of Gloria Swanson’s home? Judge Posner says that “real 
estate appraisal is not an exact science,”317 but does that necessarily 
mean that it is implausible that a real estate appraiser could 
discriminate on the basis of race? Did Gloria Swanson’s complaint 
present only a “sheer possibility” of racial discrimination because 
“real estate appraisal is not an exact science”? Judge Posner ignored 
these questions and, without explanation, jumped to the conclusion 
that “[t]he Supreme Court would consider error the plausible inference 
in this case, rather than discrimination.”318 But why was error 
conclusively more plausible than discrimination? 
The problem with Judge Posner’s approach is that it gives a judge 
too much power to look to his or her “judicial experience and common 
sense” to decide a motion to dismiss. The judge’s experience and 
                                                 
313 Id. 
314 See Thomas, supra note 19, at 31. 
315 Swanson, 614 F.3d at 408. 
316 Id. (quoting Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 715 (7th 
Cir. 1998)). 
317 Id. 
318 Id. 
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common sense should be sources for an objective standard, not 
sources for extrajudicial facts or considerations upon which to base 
inferences of plausibility.319 In Swanson, Judge Posner went beyond 
the allegations of the complaint to look toward the frequency of error 
in real estate appraisals and the difficulty of obtaining credit following 
the housing crisis.320 But the parties had not had the opportunity to 
conduct discovery or to present evidence that would counter Judge 
Posner’s findings. At this early motion-to-dismiss stage, the parties 
would have been powerless to counter Judge Posner’s conclusion that 
error was a more plausible inference than discrimination. 
 
2. Judge Wood’s Interpretation of the Plausibility Requirement 
Requires the Appropriate Level of Transactional and Substantive 
Sufficiency 
 
Judge Wood’s interpretation of Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility 
requirement, on the other hand, exhibits restraint and is fairer to the 
parties at the early motion-to-dismiss stage. Under Judge Wood’s 
approach, a court is not to “draw on its judicial experience and 
common sense” such that it draws inferences in favor of the movant 
based upon considerations beyond the allegations of the complaint.321 
In fact, Judge Wood warned against this: “‘Plausibility’ in this context 
does not imply that the district court should decide whose version to 
believe, or which version is more likely than not.”322 Judge Wood also 
warned against granting a motion to dismiss based solely upon 
inferences favoring the movant: “[I]t is not necessary to stack up 
inferences side by side and allow the case to go forward only if the 
plaintiff’s inferences seem more compelling than the opposing 
inferences.”323 Instead, Judge Wood directed courts to draw on their 
“judicial experience and common sense” only to ask if the plaintiff has 
                                                 
319 See Thomas, supra note 19, at 31, 41. 
320 See Swanson, 614 F.3d at 408–09. 
321 See id. at 402–07. 
322 Id. at 404. 
323 Id. 
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given “enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a 
story that holds together.”324 The central question for Judge Wood is 
“could these things have happened?”325 In answering this question, 
there is no room for judges to look towards facts or considerations 
beyond the complaint to draw inferences in favor of the defendant; a 
judge assessing whether a complaint’s “story” could have happened 
will not respond with discussions of the frequency of errors in real 
estate appraisals or the difficulty of obtaining credit in a bad housing 
market. Instead, the judge will look solely to the factual allegations 
contained in the complaint and ask whether, based upon his or her 
experience and common sense, there is enough to present a plausible 
claim of discrimination—is there enough to present a story of 
discrimination that “holds together”? Is there more than a “sheer 
possibility” of discrimination? 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Judge Diane Wood’s majority opinion in Swanson v. Citibank 
provides a fair approach to interpreting and applying Twombly and 
Iqbal’s plausibility requirement. It is consistent with the traditional 
function of pleadings in the federal courts, which is to provide “a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief”326 and to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is 
and the grounds upon which it rests.”327 After all, the Supreme Court’s 
trio of Twombly, Erickson, and Iqbal did not “cast any doubt on the 
validity of Rule 8.”328 The approach for which Judge Posner 
advocated in his dissent, on the other hand, would give judges too 
much power over the parties at a very early stage in litigation.329 By 
                                                 
324 Id. 
325 Id. 
326 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
327 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. 
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 
328 Swanson, 614 F.3d at 403. 
329 See Thomas, supra note 19, at 41. 
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permitting judges to look to their “judicial experience and common 
sense” for facts and considerations that support inferences that favor
the party moving for dismissal, Judge Posner’s approach would 
become the “robust gatekeeping regime” that scholars have warned
against.
 
 
 
gs that 
1 
                                                
330 Judge Wood’s inquiry into “could this have happened?” and
“does the story hold together?” provides an approach to pleadin
is “definite enough to work and yet flexible enough to do justice.”33
 
330 See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 22, at 823. 
331 See CLARK, supra note 35, at vii. 
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